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Over the last three decades, Mexico has aggressively reformed its economy, opening to foreign trade
and investment, achieving fiscal discipline, and privatizing state owned enterprises.  Despite these
efforts, the country’s economic growth has been lackluster, trailing that of many other developing
nations.  In this paper, I review arguments for why Mexico hasn’t sustained higher rates of economic
growth.  The most prominent suggest that some combination of poorly functioning credit markets,
distortions in the supply of non-traded inputs, and perverse incentives for informality creates a drag
on productivity growth.  These are factors internal to Mexico.  One possible external factor is that
the country has the bad luck of exporting goods that China sells, rather than goods that China buys.
I assess evidence from recent literature on these arguments and suggest directions for future research.
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In 1994, Mexico joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
Its admission, at the time unusual for a club of primarily rich nations, was recognition from 
OECD members that the country was on the road to success.  After a sovereign default in 1982, 
which precipitated a currency collapse and sharp contraction in GDP, Mexico was forced to 
make significant changes in its economy.  Presaging reform efforts elsewhere in Latin America 
and a decade later in Eastern Europe, the country proceeded aggressively to reduce the role of 
the state in the economy and to embrace global markets. 
Mexico’s approach was nothing if not ambitious.  After its default, it faced a difficult 
macroeconomic stabilization, from which it emerged with an independent central bank and more 
developed financial markets (Aspe, 1993).  Concomitantly, the country liberalized foreign trade 
and investment, first unilaterally, by acceding to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, 
and later regionally, through the North American Free Trade Agreement.  In the span of a few 
years, it privatized a disparate collection of nearly 1,000 state-owned enterprises, including the 
communications behemoth, Teléfonos de México (Telmex), and the country’s banks, which had 
been nationalized in a failed effort to impede capital outflows leading up to the 1982 crisis 
(Lustig, 1998).  By 1994, the year NAFTA was implemented, Mexico’s transformation seemed 
complete.  Under the guidance of three successive technocratic governments, in which PhD 
economists trained at US universities managed economic policy, the country had become a prime 
exemplar of the Washington Consensus (Kuczynksi and Williamson, 2003).   
All that was missing was economic growth.  Alas, the growth never came.  Mexico 
succeeded in lowering inflation, maintaining fiscal discipline, reducing its external debt burden, 
and increasing trade as a share of GDP.  But its growth has been lackluster.  Figure 1 plots log 2 
 
per capita GDP in Mexico against a set of comparison countries roughly similar in population 
and initial income.  Within Latin America, Mexico has kept pace with Argentina, but not Chile 
or, more recently, Brazil (panel a).  Its growth is well below Southeast Asia (panel b) and Eastern 
and Central Europe (panel c).  Between 1985 and 2008, Mexico managed an annual average 
growth rate in per capita GDP of just 1.1%, lower than all of the comparison countries except 
Venezuela (0.8%).  Given the vigor of its reforms, it is hard not to sense that Mexico has 
underachieved (Ortiz, 2003).  Managing to best only Venezuela, with its ongoing domestic 
economic and political turmoil, is hardly the future the country had envisioned.  In 2006, it was 
in part disillusionment with the economy that brought Mexico within a hair’s breadth of electing 
a populist president who campaigned on reversing earlier liberalizations. 
In this paper, I review arguments for why Mexico hasn’t sustained higher rates of 
economic growth.  Much has been made of development disappointments in lower income 
countries (e.g., Easterly, 2002; Stiglitz, 2003).  The 1990s, during which Latin America suffered 
from continued macroeconomic instability and a severe financial crisis rocked Asia, appeared to 
belie the promise of market-oriented economic reform.  However, in the 2000s such concerns 
receded, as the expansion of China and India, among other emerging nations, created a surge in 
global trade and contributed to broad-based income growth in export-oriented economies 
(Hanson, 2010).  Though the recent global recession brought a severe contraction in world 
imports in 2008 and 2009, robust trade growth has now resumed. 
In the 2000s trade boom, Mexico again seemed to miss out.  Between 2001 and 2008, 
while the other comparison countries managed annual growth rates of 2.3% or higher, Mexico 
was stuck at 1.3% (Table 1).  After three decades of sluggishness, the country’s growth record 
looks idiosyncratic, reflecting deep structural impediments rather than short term problems, such 3 
 
as real exchange rate overvaluation, which appeared responsible for the country’s weak 
performance in the early 1990s (Dornbusch and Werner, 1994).  Recent literature provides a host 
of explanations for Mexico’s laggard status.
1
Before examining the arguments for Mexico’s stagnation, it is worth reviewing common 
explanations for slow growth that are insufficient to explain the Mexican case.  Because some 
countries in Latin America have done well in the last decade, Mexico’s performance does not 
appear to be solely attributable to the region-wide institutional deficiencies that are often blamed 
for the hemisphere’s slow development.  These include a legacy of Spanish and Portuguese 
colonialism, high levels of wealth inequality, and factor endowments that facilitated the early 
emergence of a landed elite (e.g., Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Edwards, Esquivel, and 
Marquez, 2007; Edwards, 2009).   The gap between average income in the United States and 
Latin America first manifested itself in the 18
th century and later widened in the 19
th and 20
th 
centuries.  Between 1950 and 2001, there was zero convergence between Latin America and the 
US in per capita GDP.  Latin America’s decline relative to Asia and Europe, which during the 
  The most prominent suggest that some 
combination of poorly functioning credit markets, distortions in the supply of non-traded inputs, 
or perverse incentives for informality creates a drag on productivity growth.  These are factors 
internal to Mexico.  One possible external factor is that Mexico has the bad luck of exporting 
goods that China sells, rather than goods that China buys, meaning that China’s expansion has 
put downward pressure on Mexico’s terms of trade.  Clearly, none of these mechanisms is 
unique to Mexico.  For one or more of them to be able to explain Mexico’s growth record, they 
must afflict the country in a particularly severe manner. 
                                                       
1 For more in depth summaries of Mexico’s growth performance and possible explanations see Lustig (1998), which 
focuses on macroeconomic stabilization and the absence of growth in the immediate aftermath of economic reforms; 
the volumes in Levy and Walton (2009), which address the political economy of economic growth in Mexico; and 
Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2009) and Aria, Azuara, Bernal, Heckman, and Villareal (2010), which examine the 
microeconomic foundations of Mexico’s low productivity growth. 4 
 
second half of the 20
th century did converge toward US income levels, was due primarily to TFP.  
The region has long been plagued by disappointingly low productivity growth (Cole, Ohanian, 
Riascos, and Schmitz, Jr., 2005).  Latin America’s common history is surely important for 
understanding many aspects of its economic development.  Yet, in recent decades the region has 
not moved in lock step.  Chile has performed decently since the late 1980s and Brazil, Colombia, 
and Peru have since 2000.  Mexico, despite its market friendly reforms, has not joined the group, 
with its performance closer to Argentina and Venezuela, the region’s black sheep in terms of 
economic policy.  Its story must, then, have plot lines distinct from other Latin nations.  
In low income countries, Collier (2007) identifies common pitfalls that contribute to 
poverty traps.  None apply to Mexico, itself a middle income nation.  For the last 80 years, 
Mexico has avoided military and political conflict, which enveloped the country in the early 20
th 
century.  Indeed, after the 1982-1994 period of intensive economic reform, the country ended 
seven decades of single party rule and transitioned to a functioning if combative democracy.  
There has been a recent upsurge in violence associated with drug trafficking, but intense conflict 
did not emerge until 2006, too late to account for Mexico’s sluggishness.
2
                                                       
2 The growth of the drug trade may distort GDP figures for Mexico.  It is likely that value added in cultivating and 
exporting marijuana and opium, manufacturing and exporting methamphetamine, and distributing cocaine from 
South America to the United States is not fully represented in the country’s national income accounts. 
  Despite being an oil 
exporter, the resource curse does not seem to have hit Mexico.  Oil as a share of exports peaked 
in 1982 at 77% and has declined steadily since, falling below 40 percent by 1988 and below 15 
percent by 1993.  In 2009, oil accounted for just 13% of Mexico’s total exports.  Over the last 
two decades, Mexico’s trade growth has been heavily concentrated in manufacturing (Moreno-
Brid, Santamaria, and Rivas Valdivia, 2005).  If anything, Mexico has invested too little in 
petroleum exploration and production, partly as a consequence of constitutional limitations on 
foreign investment in the sector (Manzano and Monaldi, 2008).  And Mexico cannot be said to 5 
 
suffer from residing in a poor neighborhood.  NAFTA affords the country access to two nearby 
large, rich markets.  In 2009, Mexico’s exports to the US as a share of its total foreign shipments 
were 81%.  Mexico’s problems, it seems, lie elsewhere.   
 
1.  Faulty Provision of Credit  
  The provision of credit is central to the process of economic development (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998).  Without mechanisms that move savings from lenders to borrowers, a country 
has poor prospects for taking advantage of productive investment opportunities.  Mexico stands 
out for channeling low levels of private credit to firms or households.  Over the period 2001-
2008, domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP averaged 18% in Mexico, lower 
than all comparison countries except Argentina and Venezuela (Table 2).  A growing body of 
literature cites the weakness of Mexico’s credit markets as an important factor behind the 
country’s low productivity growth. 
  Poorly developed financial markets have plagued Mexico since its independence from 
Spain (Haber, 1991).  One problem has been risk of expropriation.  In the last 40 years, the 
government has expropriated the assets of private banks twice (Haber, 2005).  The first episode 
was a de facto nationalization that occurred in the mid 1970s, when the government increased the 
reserves banks were required to hold in the central bank to over 40 percent and paid an interest 
rate on these deposits that trailed the rate of inflation.  The second expropriation was an explicit 
bank nationalization in 1982, which occurred in the midst of Mexico’s sovereign default.  
Another problem has been poor oversight of bank lending.  Shortly after Mexico’s banks were 
privatized in 1991, credit provision spiked.  Haber (2005) argues that in Mexico’s haste to 
privatize its banks it failed to establish mechanisms that would impede the abuse of deposit 6 
 
insurance or lending to bank directors or other insiders.  Consequently, bank credit expanded 
rapidly, financed in part by interbank lending, which the government insured.  Rapidly 
accumulating non-performing loans and the 1994 peso collapse contributed to widespread bank 
failures.
3
  Since the 1994-1995 banking crisis, Mexico has overhauled its financial regulations.  It 
has modernized accounting standards, permitted foreign ownership of banks, set reserves 
according to the riskiness of bank loan portfolios, modified deposit insurance, and sought to 
prevent insider lending.  While bankruptcy provisions were also modified, Haber (2005) suggests 
that these reforms primarily affected easily collateralizable loans, such as for autos or homes, but 
did little to spur commercial lending.  As a result, the difficulty lenders have in seizing assets 
from borrowers continues to hinder credit provision.  In the 2004 World Bank Doing Business 
Indicators, Mexico scored a 0 out of 4 in protections provided to creditors, putting it among just 
11 countries (out of 132) in the lowest category.  In Table 2, one sees that despite Mexico’s 
reforms domestic credit to the private sector actually declined from the 1990s to the 2000s, with 
its performance relative to comparison countries showing no improvement.
  The government was later obligated to recapitalize the banking system.   
4
  Turning to how credit markets affect growth, Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe, and Soto (2002) 
suggest that Mexico’s bankruptcy laws account for Mexico’s poor performance relative to Chile.  
Beginning in the 1970s, both countries suffered government debt crises and bouts of high 
inflation which they addressed by imposing fiscal austerity and monetary restraint.  Each 
 
                                                       
3 Tornell, Westermann, and Martinez (2004) suggest that because the credit crunch was accompanied by a 
significant real exchange rate depreciation the non-traded sector was hit particularly hard, with the contraction in 
non-tradables ultimately creating bottlenecks in the supply of inputs that inhibited export growth. 
4 Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2009) and Haber (2009) suggest that while these reforms did not appreciably lower 
interest rates to borrowers they did lead to greater concentration in the banking sector and to higher profit margins 
(both in absolute terms and relative to a comparison group of 12 other countries, among which only Brazil and Peru 
had higher bank profitability).  Mexico’s government competition commission, out of concern that the country’s 
banking system is imperfectly competitive, has ruled that Mexico’s banks should make their services more 
transparent and reduce costs to consumers of switching banks.  It has also moved to lower bank entry barriers.  7 
 
liberalized trade and privatized state owned companies.  Subsequently, Chile enjoyed high 
productivity and income growth while Mexico did not.  Provisions for seizing assets of 
borrowers in default are an important remaining difference between the two nations.  Chile’s 
laws are relatively favorable toward lenders.  Through process of elimination, Bergoeing et al. 
(2002) conclude that the differences in bankruptcy laws are the most likely explanation for 
Chile’s superior performance.  While differences in bankruptcy provisions are certainly a 
plausible explanation for the two countries’ divergence, the evidence is circumstantial.  
Bergoeing et al. (2002) make a convincing case that differences in fiscal or trade policy cannot 
account for Chile’s relative success, but a host of other factors, including those mentioned below, 
remain outside consideration.  Additionally, Bergoeing et al. (2002) argue that Chile and Mexico 
privatized state-owned companies to a comparable degree.  But other literature (e.g., Levy and 
Walton, 2009) suggests that it is how Mexico privatized its companies that matters, in particular 
the country’s failure to prevent the formation of private monopolies. 
  For credit markets to be a factor in Mexico’s low growth rates, they must affect 
productivity.  To gauge the extent of barriers to investment in Mexico, McKenzie and Woodruff 
(2008) conducted an experiment in which they randomized the provision of cash grants to small 
retail firms in Mexico, the results from which allow them to estimate the marginal rate of return 
to investment.  They find that rates of return to capital are 20% to 32% per month, which were 
three to five times market interest rates during the sample period.  Rates of return are highest 
among firms that report being financially constrained (but, surprisingly, also remain above 
market rates for firms that do not report being constrained).  Their results suggest that there are 
imperfections in Mexico’s financial markets, which impede the flow of credit to profitable 
undertakings, particularly for small scale entrepreneurs.  Other evidence, some experimental and 8 
 
some not, suggests that in Ghana, India, Kenya, and Sri Lanka rates of return to capital in small 
scale enterprises are also well above market rates (see discussion in McKenzie and Woodruff, 
2008), implying that Mexico’s situation is not unique.  
Could weak protections for creditors be responsible for limited access to credit in 
Mexico?  In the United States, Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) find that in states that provide 
higher personal exemptions for debtors in bankruptcy, which limits the assets that creditors can 
seize, a lower fraction of credit is held by low-asset households, suggesting that weak creditor 
protections divert lending away from relatively poor borrowers.  Yet, diverting credit away from 
the poor, while a concern for poverty alleviation, does not necessarily translate into diminished 
productivity growth.  Fan and White (2003) find that higher exemptions for personal bankruptcy 
in US states operate as a form of wealth insurance, which increases the level of entrepreneurship, 
even as high risk borrowers are cut off from loans.
5
How important, then, are Mexico’s credit problems in explaining its growth 
performance?  Based on a survey of 4,000 firms in 54 countries during the late 1990s, Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) report that the fraction of firms saying they face severe 
obstacles in obtaining finance is highest in Mexico.  Their work also finds that firm sales growth 
is lower in countries that have greater obstacles in obtaining financing, measured in terms of 
collateral requirements, bank paperwork, or interest rates.  These findings, while intriguing, 
represent indirect evidence on economic growth, as they relate to firm sales and not productivity 
and do not account for why financial policies vary across countries.   
      
One could imagine two approaches to estimate the impact of bankruptcy provisions on 
                                                       
5 For firms in the informal sector, the incentives for entrepreneurship from generous bankruptcy provisions may be 
undermined by other aspects of the tax code.  Informal entrepreneurs, by virtue of their tax status, reap no tax 
savings from losses to income or capital.  However, they may only be able to realize substantial gains to income or 
capital by shifting into the formal sector, which brings with it an increase in tax liabilities.  The asymmetric 
treatment of gains and losses may be a disincentive to innovation among informal enterprises. 9 
 
productivity growth in Mexico.  One would be a cross country approach, similar to Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) but extended over longer time period, in which one 
regressed firm or industry growth in productivity on measures of creditor protection, exploiting 
cross country and cross time variation in bankruptcy provisions.  The obvious problem with such 
regressions is that in order for them to be well identified one would have to find sources of 
exogenous variation in countries’ financial provisions, which could be difficult.  A second 
approach would be for Mexico itself to experiment with changing its bankruptcy provisions, 
perhaps by varying the timing of adjustments in protections to creditors across states within the 
country.  One could then estimate how firm, industry, or regional outcomes change in response 
to the policy change.  Such an experiment would clearly be a significant undertaking, but given 
the low apparent return to Mexico from its extensive financial reforms to date the benefits from 
identifying which features of credit markets continue to inhibit growth may yield 
commensurately large returns. 
 
2.  Social policy and informality 
The size of the informal sector in Latin America is frequently cited as a drag on economic 
development.  Aside from de Soto’s (1989) so-called romantic perspective, in which informal 
firms are a vibrant and underappreciated part of the productive economy, many commentators 
see informality as the result of firms remaining small in order to avoid onerous government 
regulations (La Porta and Schleifer, 2008).  Informality keeps firms in existence that would be 
forced to exit, either because of poor management or outdated technology, if they had to compete 
for inputs with formal sector firms on a level playing field.  One consequence of informality is, 
therefore, the survival of small, unproductive enterprises.  The dispersion in productivity across 10 
 
plants in Mexico is much higher than in the United States.  In 2004, 36% of manufacturing 
employment in Mexico was in establishments with fewer than 50 workers and 22% was in 
establishments with fewer than 10 workers.  Enterprises with under 10 employees tend to have 
very low TFP (Pages, 2010), with 91% of these plants having productivity levels below their 
industry average.  The majority of these micro-enterprises are informal.     
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) use micro data on Mexican non-agricultural establishments to 
examine how aggregate TFP in the country would change were productivity equalized across 
establishments by moving factors toward more productive plants, while accounting for 
endogenous changes in productivity at the plant level.  Based on data for 1999 and 2004, they 
estimate that such a reallocation would raise TFP in Mexico by 100% in the manufacturing 
sector and by 250%-300% in non-manufacturing.  The aggregate productivity gain from factor 
reallocation for Mexico is, interestingly, comparable to that for China but 1.5 to 2 times larger 
than for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, or Uruguay.   
For these counterfactual exercises to be meaningful, there must be distortions in the 
economy that prevent factor reallocation from occurring naturally.  Hsieh and Klenow find that 
TFP is higher in firms that make payments into Mexico’s social security system, which is Levy’s 
(2008) preferred definition of formality, suggesting that evasion of payroll taxes is among the 
distortions contributing to productivity dispersion.  Formal sector firms make contributions to 
social security equal to 18% of the total wagebill.  Hsieh and Klenow estimate that reallocating 
factors to establishments that pay into social security would raise aggregate productivity by 19% 
in manufacturing, or one fifth of the total productivity gain from factor reallocation, implying 
informality is an important source of cross-plant differences in TFP. 
Levy (2008) makes an explicit argument for how informality affects productivity in 11 
 
Mexico.  The starting point for his critique is Mexico’s dual system of social insurance.  One 
system governs the formal economy, in which workers and employers are subject to obligatory 
payroll taxes that cover social security benefits, including retirement pensions, health care, 
disability and life insurance, child care, and housing loans.  Formal sector employment is also 
subject to regulations that govern firing and severance pay.  A second system of social insurance 
covers the workers that Levy defines as informal, including illegally employed salaried workers 
(i.e., workers that by law should be enrolled in social security but are not), workers paid on 
commission, the self employed, and unpaid workers.  These individuals have the option of 
participating in social protection programs, subject to a nominal contribution, which provide 
health care, retirement pensions, housing subsidies, child care, and life insurance.  Importantly, 
the participation of informal workers in social protection programs is voluntary and a la carte, 
allowing individuals to select into the specific programs which suite their needs.  Formal 
workers, whose contributions to social security are mandatory, have no such option.  Further, the 
monetary contributions of informal workers do not cover the full cost of social protection 
programs, with the difference met in part by consumption taxes. 
In theory, the tax on formal sector employment and the subsidy to informal sector 
employment results in a relatively low (high) marginal productivity of labor in the informal 
(formal) sector, creating static inefficiency and depressing aggregate TFP.  Empirical evidence, 
as seen, is consistent with such outcomes.  Additionally, informality may have negative dynamic 
effects on productivity, and therefore growth, if keeping wages of formal establishments 
artificially high reallocates investment toward lower productivity informal firms.  In Mexico it 
appears that the returns to labor market experience are lower in informal than in formal 
employment, which may indicate that informality suppresses the accumulation of human capital 12 
 
(Arias, Asuara, Bernal, Heckman, and Villarreal, 2010).  While the theoretical linkages between 
informality and growth are clear, making the empirical connection is more problematic.  
Informality appears to result in a lower level of TFP but does it suppress TFP growth?  In 
Mexico’s case, one would want to know whether raising the benefits to informal workers 
through social protection programs (financed by consumption taxes) lowers the growth rate.  
Research has yet to provide a definitive answer to this question. 
What research has examined is whether the recent expansions of social protection 
programs available to informal workers have reallocated employment toward the informal sector.  
The aggregate data show no upward trend in informality (Arias, Asuara, Bernal, Heckman, and 
Villarreal, 2010).  Between 1995 and 2009, the fraction of workers employed outside of the 
social security system in Mexico actually declined, from 66% to 62%, though informality did 
rise among urban workers.  Among the different categories of informal workers, only the share 
of illegal salaried labor in employment has increased over time.  The employment share of self-
employed workers has been stable and the share for workers paid on commission has fallen. 
In micro-level analysis of whether Mexico’s dual system of social insurance has 
increased informality, Barros (2008) exploits regional variation in the timing of the role out of 
Seguro Popular, a large health insurance program available to workers who are not covered by 
social security which is the centerpiece of Mexico’s new system of social protection.  The 
program amounted to a substantial increase in the quality and quantity of health insurance to 
qualifying individuals, who account for roughly half the population, forcing the government to 
phase in the program gradually.   The timing of the roll out favored small states and states not in 
control of the main opposition political party.  Barros finds that in repeated cross section data the 
probability a household head works in the informal sector is uncorrelated with the government 13 
 
projected enrollment intensity of Seguro Popular (i.e., the planned enrollment in a state in a 
given year based on the roll out strategy), meaning that individuals in states exposed to earlier 
roll out of Seguro Popular were not more likely to be employed informally.  Because program 
intensity is not random, the results are hard to interpret.  The estimation strategy would 
underestimate the effect of Seguro Popular on informality if the planned roll out of the program 
was more rapid in states subject to shocks that disfavor formality.   
Knox (2008) addresses similar questions using panel data on 800 families, exploiting 
temporal variation in which families were eligible for Seguro Popular (thus allowing her to 
control for household fixed effects in informal status).  Becoming eligible for the program 
increases labor force participation, which implies an increase in employment in the informal 
sector given that eligible households are those that do not qualify for social security.  Juarez 
(2008) focuses on the roll out of a free health care program in Mexico City, finding that for 
females (in salaried employment with no more than 12 years of education) expanded health 
benefits reduces the likelihood of being employed formally (i.e., being covered by social 
security).  Though the literature is still young, there is some evidence that expanded health 
insurance for informal workers increases employment in the informal sector. 
The level of TFP in informal establishments in Mexico is low relative to formal plants.  
Mexico’s social protection programs may be raising the incentive for informality, possibly 
hindering growth.  However, the newness of these programs suggests they cannot account for 
Mexico’s poor growth performance prior to the late 1990s.  Social protection programs for the 
poor in Mexico have accommodated informality, thereby contributing to its persistence, but 
cannot explain the origins of informality in Mexico or why the growth effects of informality in 
the country would be worse than elsewhere in Latin America.    14 
 
 
3.  Too little regulation (or too much) 
In comparing production costs across countries, Mexico stands out for having high prices 
for electricity, high prices for telecommunications services, expensive and spotty internet 
services, and a scarcity of skilled labor.  In each of these input markets, specific interest groups 
are blamed either for impeding the government from enforcing anti-monopoly regulations or for 
convincing the government to regulate markets in a way that preserves their capacity to earn 
rents (Levy and Walton, 2009).  While I discuss just three input markets, these arguments have 
been applied to other sectors of Mexico’s economy, as well (see Guerrero, Lopez-Calva, and 
Walton, 2009).  While unfavorable conditions in Mexico’s input markets are well documented, it 
is less clear whether they can account for Mexico’s poor relative growth. 
The most maligned industrialist in Mexico is perhaps Carlos Slim, the world’s richest 
person and the largest shareholder in Telmex, Mexico’s telecommunications giant.  Slim is 
blamed for using his acquisition of Telmex from the government first to establish and later to 
protect monopoly power in markets for landline telephone services, mobile telephony, and 
internet access.  In data for 2006-2008, Mexico compares poorly to other countries in the costs of 
its telecom services.  Among a group of developing and developed nations,
6
                                                       
66 The comparison countries are Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, EU nations, Hungary, 
Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Turkey, and the United States. 
 it has the highest 
levels of single-firm concentration in fixed and mobile telephone industries (with Telmex 
controlling over 90 percent in the former and over 70 percent in the latter), the highest costs of 
fixed line business telephone services (which are two and half times the level in the United 
States), and the lowest number of broadband internet subscribes per capita (Chiquiar and Ramos-
Francia, 2009).  While it is plausible that Telmex’s dominant market position allows it to earn 15 
 
supra-normal profits, it is unclear whether such an outcome matters for Mexico’s growth rate.  
The argument would have to be that high prices for telecom services depress capital 
accumulation or innovation.  A causal link between the price and availability of 
telecommunications services and economic growth has yet to be established. 
Surprising as it may seem for a country that exports oil, Mexico has relatively high prices 
for electricity.  Since 2000, electricity prices per kilowatt hour in Mexico have exceeded those in 
the United States by 1.1 to 1.7 times.  Among comparison countries, Mexico has the highest rate 
of energy loss, measured as energy produced but not paid for as a percentage of total energy 
handled (Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia, 2009).  Electricity production in Mexico is the sole 
provenance of two state owned companies, which have historically had strong labor unions.  The 
proximate causes for Mexico’s high costs and low quality in electricity generation include 
reliance on oil based production, low labor productivity, and high wages for electricity workers, 
who are among the most highly paid workers in the country and whose average wage rates are 
over three times the average for formal sector workers.  Holding output constant, were electricity 
generation in Mexico to operate with the same labor productivity as in Chile, Mexico would have 
62% fewer workers in the sector.  As with telecommunications services, high electricity prices 
raise production costs relative to other countries.  Again, however, it is unclear how the price of 
electricity affects the rate of economic growth. 
An input market whose functioning does have well established effects on growth is the 
supply of skilled labor.  If Mexico’s public schools or labor market regulations somehow reduce 
the incentive to attain education, then Mexico may have lower growth rates, resulting either from 
a reduced supply of innovation-producing scientists and engineers (e.g., Jones, 1995) or from 
missing out on positive externalities in the accumulation of human capital (e.g., Lucas, 1988).  In 16 
 
2007, only 50% of Mexicans 15-19 years old were enrolled in public or private educational 
institutions, slightly above levels for Turkey but 20% to 42% below Brazil, Chile, Estonia, 
Hungary, Korea, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia (Arias et al., 2010).  Mexico’s 
poor education performance may be attributable to the capture of its education system by 
powerful labor unions.  Close to 90% of public education expenditure in Mexico is on 
compensation of staff, leaving little left over for buildings, computers, or other educational 
infrastructure.  However, other countries in Latin America also have unionized public education, 
which raises the question of why Mexico’s would have consequences that are more deleterious 
for growth.  Mexico’s labor unions have strongly opposed linking teacher pay to student 
performance but this hardly makes them unique.  
Beyond rates of tertiary education, Mexican students perform poorly in standardized tests 
relative to students in other nations at roughly similar income levels.  Combining PISA scores for 
math, reading and science, Mexico does worse than all developing countries except Brazil, 
scoring well below Chile, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Korea, Poland, Russia, and the 
Slovak Republic, both in absolute terms and relative to what one would predict based on 
expenditure per student in the country (Arias et al., 2010).  Pritchett and Viarengo (2009) suggest 
that what may matter for country’s economic development is not the average performance of 
students but the number of high achievers.  Here again, Mexico’s does not compare well.  A 
PISA score of 625 qualifies a student as advanced.  Only 0.3% of Mexican students attain a score 
of 625 or higher, relative to 18% in Korea, 9% in the Slovak Republic, and 2% in Thailand.  If 
such high achievers are used intensively in developing or applying new technology, Mexico may 
face supply constraints in R&D relative to other countries. 
Another factor potentially affecting Mexico’s supply of skilled labor is emigration to the 17 
 
United States.  As of 2008, there were 11.4 million individuals born in Mexico residing in the 
US, equal to 9.5% of the total Mexico born population (defined as the sum of Mexico born 
individuals in Mexico and the United States).  Emigrants are overrepresented among the young.  
In 2000, 18% of Mexico born men aged 16 to 25 were residing in the United States, compared to 
9% of 46 to 55 year olds.  However, the skill profile of emigrants differs only modestly from 
individuals that remain in Mexico.  Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) compare the earnings of non-
migrants in Mexico with the earnings that emigrants would earn were they to return to the 
country and be paid according to prevailing wage patterns.  Emigrant men are drawn 
disproportionately from the middle of Mexico’s wage distribution, whereas emigrant women are 
modestly positively selected.  These results are based on 1990 and 2000 censuses for Mexico and 
the United States, in which one might be concerned about the undercount of illegal immigrants.  
Kaestner and Malamud (2010) largely replicate Chiquiar’s and Hanson’s findings using the 
Mexican Family Life Survey, which tracks individuals in Mexico over time, including those that 
migrate to the US, whether legally or illegally.   
We know little about how emigration affects skill or capital accumulation in Mexico.  
Higher emigration puts upward pressure on Mexican wages (Mishra, 2007: Aydemir and Borjas, 
2007), reducing the incentive for capital inflows.  Since the majority of Mexican migrants enter 
the United States illegally (Hanson, 2006), they may perceive weak incentives to continue their 
education beyond secondary school.  Thus, emigration may be contributing to Mexico’s 
observed low rates of school attendance among 15 to 19 year olds.  In rural Mexico, McKenzie 
and Rapoport (2010 find that the likelihood of completing secondary school or beginning high 
school is lower for youths in households that have sent migrants abroad.  
While we see that Mexico produces few highly educated students relative to other 18 
 
countries, the literature has yet to explain why or quantify the implications of this fact for 
economic growth.  Garcia-Verdu (2007) estimates that rising educational attainment – 
specifically, the decline in the share of workers with no schooling or primary schooling and in 
the increase in the share with secondary or tertiary schooling – accounts for 74% of Mexico’s 
GDP growth over 1988-1994 and 65% over 1995-2005.  However, aggregate TFP growth was 
negative in both time periods.  If educational attainment was rising, why was TFP declining?  
This question cannot be answered in a standard growth accounting framework, in which TFP 
growth is taken as given.  Obvious directions for future research are to examine the link between 
schooling, academic performance, emigration, and TFP levels and growth rates in Mexico. 
 
4.  The perils of competing with China 
In the 1980s, as Mexico embarked upon a strategy of export-led development it sought to 
emulate the successful industrializers of East Asia.  Then President Carlos Salinas cited Korea, in 
particular, as a model for Mexico, with hopes that the country would create its own chaebol – 
Korea’s large industrial groups characterized by vertical integration in production, horizontal 
differentiation in output, and rapid export growth – to lead the country into the global economy.  
The reality turned out to be far different.  Exports have grown dramatically in Mexico, rising 
from 12% of GDP in 1982 to 28% in 2008.  However, it is not large, vertically integrated firms 
that export the bulk of Mexico’s goods.  Instead, nearly half of the country’s manufacturing 
exports and over 20 percent of its manufacturing value added (as of 2006) are produced by 
maquiladoras, or export assembly plants, which import inputs from abroad, primarily the United 
States, assemble or process the inputs into final outputs, and then export the finished goods, 
again primarily to the US (Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson, 2010).  Hong Kong and Taiwan also 19 
 
began their industrial development with heavy reliance on export assembly.  Their firms later 
graduated into original-equipment manufacture and own-brand production, which involves 
greater in-house fabrication of inputs and design of outputs (Enright, Scott, and Dodwell, 1997).  
Mexico has not made such a transition.  While the country has progressed from assembling 
apparel to assembling electronics and auto parts, it remains specialized in the labor-intensive 
processing of inputs for the US economy. 
Mexico’s failure to graduate from export assembly has left it exposed to competition 
from China, whose abundance in low skilled labor has given it a strong comparative advantage in 
labor-intensive manufacturing.  By the late 1990s, export processing plants in China, which are 
similar to Mexico’s maquiladoras, accounted for over half of the country’s manufacturing 
exports (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005).  For Mexico, China’s growth is more threatening than it is 
for other countries in Latin America.  Other large Latin nations tend to export the minerals, 
agricultural goods, and other commodities that China imports.  In Mexico, as already mentioned, 
petroleum now accounts for less than 15 percent of exports.  For better or worse, Mexico’s 
fortunes in the global economy are tied to manufacturing.  Over the period 2000-2005, 
manufacturing accounted for 88% of exports in China and 83% in Mexico, but only 54% in 
Brazil, 34% in Colombia, 20% in Peru, and 16% in Chile.   
Figure 2 shows that over the period 1991 to 2007, China’s share of US manufacturing 
imports rose steadily, whereas Mexico’s share rose through the 1990s and then begin to decline.  
For both countries, there is an inflection point in 2001, at which time China’s increase in US 
market share accelerated and Mexico changed from having a rising share to a declining one.  The 
significance of 2001 is that this year marks China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, 
giving it most favored nation status among WTO members.  It is plausible that China’s joining 20 
 
the WTO helped it to capture foreign market share from Mexico (see, e.g., Brambilla, 
Khandelwal, and Schott, 2010, on the apparel and textile industries). 
The challenge of China’s export growth for Mexico is that the two countries specialize in 
similar goods.  Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2009) calculate correlations between indices of 
revealed comparative advantage for Mexico and for other developing countries.  Mexico’s 
ranking of goods by revealed comparative advantage is most strongly correlated with Hungary, 
followed by in close order by Thailand, the Philippines, Korea, Turkey, Poland, and China.  
They find further that in the last decade Mexico has been losing comparative advantage vis-à-vis 
China in around 40% of its manufacturing exports (including electrical machinery, computers 
and electronics, furniture, and non-metallic minerals), while maintaining a comparative 
advantage in another third of its products (including automobiles and auto parts, industrial 
machinery, and beverages).  Hanson and Robertson (2010) use results from a gravity model of 
trade to estimate the change in demand for Mexico’s exports that would have occurred had 
China’s export supply capacity remained constant over the period 1995 to 2005.  For Mexico, 
nullifying the improvement in China’s export capability would mean a 2% to 4% increase in the 
global demand for Mexico’s exports, an effect that is larger than for any other manufacturing 
oriented developing economy.
7
                                                       
7 The comparison countries are Hungary, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, and Turkey. 
  Hsieh and Ossa (2010) take a more theoretical approach, 
introducing Ricardian productivity differences into a Melitz (2003) model of trade, deriving 
comparative statics for changes in wages and prices resulting from productivity changes in 
different countries, calibrating the model to data, and then calculating the counterfactual income 
levels that would have obtained had productivity growth in China over 1993-1994 to 2004-2005 
been zero.  Not surprisingly, slower productivity growth in China means higher real incomes in 21 
 
Mexico.  Had China’s productivity been flat, Mexico’s welfare would have been 0.8% higher, a 
larger effect than for any other economy that Hsieh and Ossa consider.   
Aside from effects on the level of income in Mexico, could competition from China 
explain Mexico’s lackluster economic growth?  If so, the argument would go as follows.  Since 
the late 1980s, China has been undergoing a transition from a rural economy dominated by state 
owned enterprises to an urban and more market-oriented one.  The transition is protracted, as it 
involves moving over a 150 million workers from the countryside to cities, importing foreign 
technology, opening China’s markets to the rest of the world, and allowing private firms to 
replace the state in production.   China’s size, high rate of growth, and increasing outward 
orientation mean that its emergence is surely changing international prices, improving the terms 
of trade for countries that produce its importables and deteriorating the terms of trade for 
countries that produce its exportables.  Mexico fits squarely in the latter camp, whereas 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru fit in the former.  Nevertheless, the downward 
pressure on the price of Mexico’s export goods is unlikely to be permanent.  It will abate once 
China completes its transition or accumulates enough human and physical capital to graduate 
from the cone of diversification that Mexico now occupies and to move to a cone specializing in 
more skill and capital intensive products, a process which may already be underway.  The impact 
of China on Mexico, then, is not about long run growth but a prolonged transitional period in 
which China has been realizing its latent comparative advantage. 
The main problem with the China hypothesis for Mexico’s growth record is timing.  In 
Figure 2, it is apparent that competition from China became most acute after 2001, suggesting 
China may have had only a modest role in Mexico’s slow growth in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
While China’s continued rise may be not good news for Mexico, it cannot be the sole factor 22 
 
behind Mexico’s performance over the last three decades. 
 
5.  Final discussion 
Any discussion of growth and development in Mexico ends up resembling a Diego 
Rivera mural, overstuffed with historical characters that collide in repeated and unexpected 
ways.  Mexico’s underperformance is overdetermined.  The faulty provision of credit, 
persistence of informality, control of key input markets by elites, continued ineffectiveness of 
public education, and vulnerability to adverse external shocks each may have a role in explaining 
Mexico’s development trajectory over the last three decades.  We do not yet know the relative 
importance of these factors for the country’s growth record. 
Perhaps what is most striking about Mexico’s recent experience is that the country has 
tried so hard but achieved so little.  The breadth and depth of reform in the country is astounding, 
yet Mexico does not have much to show for it.  Going forward, one would hope that future 
research would focus on providing guidance to policy makers about which specific policy 
interventions may be effective.  One can imagine individual research agendas to estimate the 
impact of changes in bankruptcy provisions, social insurance programs, anti-monopoly 
regulations, government regulation of electricity markets, or public education on industrial or 
regional productivity.  Such research would undoubtedly be of use to Mexican policy makers.  
But there is a danger in focusing exclusively on individual policies and ignoring their 
interactions.  Even a cursory examination of Mexico’s economic structure suggests the country is 
deep in the world of the second best, meaning that models based on a single distortion may be a 
poor guide to how future reform would change economic outcomes in the country. 
An example from the discussion in this paper helps drive the point home.  Bankruptcy 23 
 
provisions that are overly protective of borrowers inhibit the flow of credit to individuals whose 
observable characteristics suggest they are poor credit risks.  The high rate of return to 
investment in small-scale enterprises suggests that credit market imperfections impede 
productive investments.  Yet, the high rate of return to capital exists in small-scale enterprises 
that other data suggest have very low TFP and whose survival depends in part on evading payroll 
taxes that formal sector firms do not escape.  If the distortions that cause informality are 
maintained, reforming bankruptcy provisions could be counter-productive in that it would shift 
investment towards the country’s least productive establishments.  If one wants to consider 
reforming bankruptcy provisions in Mexico, one should also seek to understand how these 
provisions interact with social insurance programs that may promote informality.  Research, 
then, would benefit from proceeding along two tracks, one that performs rigorous 
microeconomic analysis of individual policy interventions and another that uncovers the general 
equilibrium interactions of these policies.   
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FIGURE 1:  ECONOMIC GROWTH IN COMPARISON COUNTRIES 
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FIGURE 2:  SHARE OF US MANUFACTURING IMPORTS 
 
 



















TABLE 1:  RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH  
 
Average annual change  
   log per capita GDP 
Country  1985-2008  2001-2008 
Argentina  0.016  0.032 
Brazil  0.014  0.023 
Bulgaria  0.022  0.062 
Chile  0.042  0.031 
Colombia  0.019  0.031 
Czech Republic  0.020  0.040 
Hungary  0.018  0.035 
Indonesia  0.035  0.038 
Malaysia  0.035  0.031 
Mexico  0.011  0.013 
Peru  0.015  0.044 
Philippines  0.013  0.028 
Poland  0.039  0.042 
Romania  0.012  0.068 
Thailand  0.045  0.037 
Turkey  0.027  0.033 
Venezuela  0.008  0.027 
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TABLE 2:  DOMESTIC CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR (% OF GDP) 
      Country  1991-2000  2001-2008 
Argentina  20.16  13.79 
Brazil  56.42  36.89 
Colombia  32.72  27.03 
Czech Republic  65.72  39.32 
Hungary  27.82  49.22 
Indonesia  45.73  24.24 
Malaysia  163.44  130.94 
Mexico  25.62  17.98 
Peru  19.13  21.16 
Philippines  42.09  33.58 
Poland  21.73  32.80 
Romania  9.33  20.95 
Thailand  127.55  103.01 
Turkey  19.90  21.90 
Venezuela  16.93  14.63 
      Notes:  Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector, such 
as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, trade credits and other accounts receivable.  Source:  
WDI. 
 